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THE LAW MAY CAVE, BUT ECONOMICS WILL NOT: THE 




Early in the 2015 NFL football season, New England Patriots 
quarterback Tom Brady whizzed his 400th career touchdown to receiver 
Danny Amendola in the second quarter of a Sunday afternoon game.1  
Upon catching the touchdown, Amendola gave the ball to a Patriots fan 
sitting behind the end zone.2  The ball carried significant value and 
Brady sought to get it back.  Brady and the fan eventually exchanged the 
touchdown ball for various autographs and another NFL ball used in that 
game.3  The value of the 400th touchdown ball is a mystery since it 
never reached the open market, so one can only speculate its value.  To 
give a contextual reference, though, one may consider an ordinary, 
game-used NFL ball signed by Hall of Fame wide receiver Jerry Rice 
being sold for $4,500.4  
Compare Brady’s quid pro quo exchange to that of Terrelle Pryor, a 
former Ohio State University quarterback.  In 2011, Pryor sold some 
autographed memorabilia and his conference championship ring to a 
Columbus tattoo artist in exchange for discounted tattoos.5  As 
punishment, the NCAA determined that Pryor had to miss the first five 
games of the 2011 season and repay $2,500, representing the value of 
           * Associate Member, 2015-2016 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  Specials thanks to 
Professor Timothy Armstrong at University of Cincinnati College of Law for giving me direction to 
select this topic. 
 1. Connor Orr, Brady Gets 400th TD Ball Back for Meeting, Autographs, AROUND THE NFL 
(Oct. 1, 2015) , http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000546599/article/brady-gets-400th-td-ball-
back-for-meeting-autographs.  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Shopping Suggestions for Jerry Rice Signed Football, SPORTS MEMORABILIA, 
http://www.sportsmemorabilia.com/sports-products/1998-49ers-jerry-rice-game-used-signed-
touchdown-football-vs-falcons.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).  As of November 3, 2015 the ball is still 
available for sale on this site.  Id. 
 5. Zach Dirlam, Scandal at Ohio State (Part 1 of 5): The Tattooed Five and Tressel’s Cover 
Up, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 2, 2015), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/719411-scandal-at-ohio-state-
part-1-of-5-the-tattooed-five-tressels-cover-up.  To be sure, the memorabilia he sold was more than old 
jock straps or smelly practice uniforms.  “Pryor sold his 2008 Big Ten championship ring, Fiesta Bowl 
Sportsmanship Award and his 2008 gold pants, which are given to all Ohio State Football players when 
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the goods he exchanged.6  The tattoo artist sold Pryor’s ring on eBay for 
$18,000 in 2013.7  
The difference between Brady and Pryor is amateurism.  Brady is a 
professional who plays in the NFL, which generated about $11 billion in 
revenue in 2014;8 Pryor is an amateur who plays in the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association—more commonly known as the 
NCAA—which generated about $3.5 billion in football-related revenue 
in 2013.9  To be fair, NCAA football only accounts for about twenty-
five percent of that revenue, but the punishment would be identical if 
any NCAA athlete did the same.10  As Around the NFL writer Connor 
Orr put it, “for once, we leave a Tom Brady/football story right where it 
is.  No need to get any lawyers involved.”11  Unfortunately, that was not 
the case for Pryor. 
NCAA athletes continue to fight to earn a share of the revenues the 
NCAA generates from use of its athletes’ names and likenesses, in 
addition to those driven from the lucrative television and marketing 
deals held by the NCAA.  This article explores the various legal hurdles 
NCAA athletes have faced over the past ten years, ultimately bringing 
them to the 2015 O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n12 
lawsuit where the NCAA and its former athletes fought a brutal antitrust 
dispute.  Antitrust litigation is the most recent, though certainly not the 
final, chapter of a novel filled with athletes suing the NCAA for the 
appropriation of their names and likenesses.13 
Part II begins with a discussion of the history of the NCAA and its 
amateurism policies that lead to a revenue gap between the NCAA and 
its student athletes.  Part III will put these issues in context with 
examples of legal challenges student athletes have battled, including the 
focus of this article: the O’Bannon case.  Part IV delves deeper into 
antitrust law and the central legal dispute in O’Bannon, thereafter 
 6. Id. 
 7. Levi Damien, Terrelle Pryor Ohio State “Tattoo Scandal” Championship Ring Sells on 
eBay, SB NATION (June 9, 2013), http://www.silverandblackpride.com/2013/6/9/4412528/terrelle-
pryor-ohio-state-tattoo-scandal-championship-ring-sells-on-ebay. 
 8. Daniel Kaplan, NFL Projecting Revenue Increase of $1B Over 2014, SPORTS BUS. J. (Mar. 9, 
2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/03/09/Leagues-and-Governing-
Bodies/NFL-revenue.aspx. 
 9. The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. OFF. OF 
POSTSECONDARY EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/ (follow “download custom data” then select 
“Criteria” and “NCAA Division I-A,” “Continue with all found,” select boxes for “2013” and 
“Revenues,” finally select “Football” in the Sport Code and Download the data.  Column “AD” lists the 
Total Revenue generated per institution, which totals roughly $3.5 billion) (last visited Nov. 21, 2016).  
 10. Id. 
 11. Orr, supra note 1. 
 12. O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 13. See, e.g., Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013).  
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discussing how the court applied antitrust law.  Part V introduces 
additional challenges, both legal and nonlegal, related to compensating 
student athletes that the court does not discuss in O’Bannon.  
II. HISTORY OF THE NCAA AND AMATEURISM 
A. History of the NCAA 
President Theodore Roosevelt directed the inception of the NCAA 
when he and leaders in college athletics discussed reforming their 
current methods of college athletic governance.14  Prior to this reform, 
student groups loosely oversaw the various sports, and teams would 
often hire nonstudents to play for their teams to increase their chances of 
winning.15  The influx of nonstudents competing resulted in a bounty of 
“injuries and deaths and prompted many colleges and universities to 
discontinue football.”16  Thus, the NCAA was formed “to protect young 
people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics practice of the 
time.”17 
The NCAA began as a forum for various leaders to congregate and 
discuss the challenges they faced in their respective programs and 
sports.  As it expanded, so did its mission.18  In 1921, the NCAA 
conducted its first national championship in track-and-field.19  
Additional rules committees began to form in other sports, following in 
track-and-field’s footsteps, leading to the first basketball national 
championship in 1939.20  Although championships provided additional 
structure for the NCAA, the competitive imbalance remained on the 
field as teams abused recruiting and financial aid to put the best team 
possible on the field.21 
Following World War II, the NCAA faced new challenges as 
television became a prevalent medium for consumers to engage in 
collegiate athletics.22  With television came media contracts, heightened 
interest in athletics, and the expansion of the NCAA.23  As a result of 
 14. History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, NCAA, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/ab
out+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last updated Nov. 8, 2010). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 14. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
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this growth and imbalance in competition, the NCAA divided into three 
separate, hierarchical divisions: Divisions I, II, and III.24  These 
different divisions held their own legislative powers within the scope of 
the NCAA, but more importantly, balanced the size and competition of 
the NCAA member schools.25 
Women’s athletics expanded across all divisions, and ten 
championships were formed in Divisions II and III in the 1980s.26  
Around the same time, tensions began to rise as academic standards for 
participation were inconsistent and the NCAA lost dominion over its 
television contract based on NCAA v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, a 
1984 Supreme Court antitrust case.27  At the time, the NCAA held its 
first contract with CBS broadcasting—a three-year agreement earning 
the NCAA $49 million.28  The Supreme Court determined that the 
NCAA’s television contract was a violation of the Clayton and Sherman 
antitrust acts.29  According to the Court, the antitrust laws are supposed 
to prohibit group restraint on trade, which the NCAA violated by 
controlling which teams would be televised.30  In response, the major 
colleges began to form their own television contracts to keep their teams 
televised.31  The NCAA countered by threatening to revoke schools’ 
memberships in the NCAA.32  The Supreme Court ruled this to be an 
unfair restraint on trade and required the NCAA to grant contractual 
freedom to major colleges seeking individual television deals.33  
B. Amateurism  
As mentioned in the Brady-Pryor dichotomy, amateurism rules 
prohibit Pryor from engaging in his tattoo exchange while leaving Brady 
free to act as he may.  In order to participate in NCAA competition, 
athletes must hold amateur status.34  The NCAA contends that 
“[a]mateur competition is a bedrock principle of college athletics and 
 24. History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 14. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 28. Revenue of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).  
 29. See Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Amateurism in the National Collegiate Athletic Association, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Dec. 2, 2015). 
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the NCAA.”35  In order to maintain amateur status, one must refrain 
from (1) contracting with professional teams; (2) earning a salary for 
participating in athletics; (3) earning prize money above actual and 
necessary expenses; (4) playing with professionals; (5) participating in 
tryouts, practice or competition with a professional team; (6) receiving 
benefits from an agent or prospective agent; (7) entering an agreement 
to be represented by an agent; and (8) seeking delayed initial full-time 
collegiate enrollment to participate in organized sports competition.36 
Perhaps the prohibitions of amateurism seem less than daunting, but 
the NCAA’s interpretation and enforcement of those prohibitions tell a 
different story.  Consider the story of Silas Nacita, a walk-on football 
player at Baylor University who had previously been homeless.37  
Nacita accepted food and shelter from an acquaintance while he 
attended class and played football at Baylor.38  Upon learning about his 
aid, the NCAA and Baylor determined that Nacita was permanently 
ineligible from participating in NCAA athletics.39  While a stringent 
interpretation of amateurism rules may help to maintain the NCAA’s 
posture, this decision “turns Maslow’s hierarchy of needs on its head.”40 
The NCAA claims that its primary purpose for demanding amateur 
status is to “ensure the students’ priority remains on obtaining a quality 
educational experience and that all of the student athletes are competing 
equitably.”41  While this may be true, maintaining this amateur-student 
status precludes athletes from asserting other rights like collective 
bargaining and publicity rights.42  For example, in Northwestern 
University & College Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA),43 the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that a group of student 
athletes could be employees, which may permit them to unionize and 
collectively bargain, but failed to effectuate such a decision and instead 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Chip Patterson, Ex-Baylor RB Silas Nacita Permanently Ineligible, Looking into NAIA, CBS 
SPORTS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/25140867/ex-
baylor-rb-silas-nacita-permanent-ineligible-looking-into-naia-options. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Marc Edelman, Don’t Feed (or Shelter) the Athletes: The Absurdity of NCAA Amateurism in 
2015, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/02/28/dont-feed-or-
shelter-the-athletes-the-absurdity-of-ncaa-amateurism-in-2015/; Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY, http://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html (last updated 2016). 
 41. Amateurism in the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 34. 
 42. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167 slip op. (Aug. 
17, 2015); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 43. See Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Director Region 13 Issues Decisions in Northwestern 
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denied jurisdiction.44  The NLRB suggested that asserting jurisdiction 
over the claim would not promote labor stability given the nature and 
structure of the NCAA.45  NCAA athletes with collective bargaining 
power could lobby for better nutrition services, improved medical 
services, increased scholarships, and increased stipends for players.46  
C. NCAA and the Student Athlete Revenue Gap 
At the end of the 2011–2012 season, the NCAA generated $871.6 
million in revenue.47  Eighty-one percent of this revenue came from 
television and marketing rights fees, which is about $706 million.48  
According to an audited statement provided by USA Today, the NCAA 
generated $989 million in revenue in 2014, which would equate to $801 
million generated from television- and marketing-rights fees if the 
eighty-one percent figure from 2011–2012 remained the same.49  But, 
these revenues do not correlate to the amount of NCAA athletes’ 
scholarship dollars or grants-in-aid, which are arguably the only direct 
benefits that the athletes receive.  The resulting equity gap between 
student athletes and the NCAA continues to expand alongside the 
NCAA’s growth.  
In 1982, CBS Broadcasting and the NCAA began their partnership by 
signing a three-year $49.9 million television-broadcasting contract with 
a primary interest in airing the storied March Madness basketball 
tournament.  That relationship has grown substantially since, with the 
most recent agreement, signed in 2010, lasting for fourteen years and 
valued at $10.8 billion.50  The majority of this money went to the 
member schools and accounted for about twenty-four percent of the 
revenue generated by the member schools’ athletics programs.51  In turn, 
only fifteen percent of that total revenue made it to athletes in the form 
 44. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, slip op. 
 45. Office of Pub. Affairs, Board Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in Northwestern 
Case, NLRB (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-unanimously-
decides-decline-jurisdiction-northwestern-case.   
 46. Tom Farrey, Northwestern Players Denied Request to Form First Union for Athletes, ESPN 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/13455477/nlrb-says-northwestern-
players-cannot-unionize. 
 47. Revenue of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 28. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY SPORTS 
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-
2014-1-billion-revenue/70161386/. 
 50. Revenue of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 28. 
 51. Daniel L. Fulks, NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Revenues & Expenses 
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of scholarships and grants.52   Although the money does trickle down to 
the student athletes, the NCAA governs the quantity of scholarships and 
the amount of money member schools may assign in scholarships in 
order to level competition.53  These limits are rarely changed and 
therefore eliminate any proportional gains NCAA athletes may receive 
relative to the NCAA’s success.54  Until recently, these scholarships fell 
far below the mark by providing student athletes an insufficient amount 
of financial support.55  Scholarships were intended to cover the “cost of 
attendance” for a student athlete; the NCAA’s definition was quite 
narrow, but is now expanding.56  The “cost of attendance” has always 
included tuition, fees, books, and room and board.  As of August 1, 
2015, it will also now include “expenses such as academic-related 
supplies, transportation and other similar items.”57 
The NCAA does not share its revenues and successes with the student 
athletes that comprise its product.  This void leaves student athletes 
removed from the overall picture of success and creates a deficit that 
leaves student athletes searching for other revenue streams.  The NCAA 
uses athletes’ on-field talents to profit while simultaneously prohibiting 
athletes from doing the same.  Student athletes became increasingly 
aware of the imbalance and began taking action in an effort to take their 
share. 
III. THE ROAD TO O’BANNON: HISTORY OF NAME AND LIKENESS 
APPROPRIATION IN THE NCAA  
NCAA athletes have fought many battles against the NCAA and 
various entities that, according to the athletes, appropriate their name, 
image, and likeness (NIL).  These issues over athletes’ NILs have 
touched on many other areas of law prior to O’Bannon’s antitrust 
dispute.58  In order to better understand the context of O’Bannon, one 
 52. Id. at 42. 
 53. Patrick O’Rourke, College Athletic Scholarship Limits, SCHOLARSHIPSTATS, 
http://www.scholarshipstats.com/ncaalimits.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA 
MEDIA CENTER (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomy-schools-
adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. To be sure, many other antitrust battles have taken place between the NCAA and its 
institutions and/or NCAA athletes.  See, e.g., Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 87 (1984) 
(holding that the NCAA television contract was not a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, but 
that the “anticompetitive limitation on price and output was not offset by any procompetitive 
justifications sufficient to save the plan even when the totality of the circumstances was examined”); 
Summary Jury Trial Data Collection Form, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK, 2008 Jury Verdicts 
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must understand the backdrop of important cases involving the NCAA 
and its athletes that precede O’Bannon.59  The two most contentious 
areas of law are copyright and collective bargaining, each discussed 
below. 
A. Copyright 
The core of the O’Bannon dispute is the appropriation of student 
athletes’ NILs—generally known as the right of publicity—which is a 
subset of copyright law in the broader context of intellectual property 
rights.60  Conveniently, antitrust law and intellectual property law have 
many similarities, the strongest being that both areas of law seek to 
protect property rights, albeit in their own ways.61  
In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,62 the appellant, an ex-NCAA 
quarterback, sued Electronic Arts (EA), a video-game developer, 
alleging a violation of his right of publicity under New Jersey law.63  EA 
raised a transformative use defense.64  The primary inquiry of this 
defense is “whether the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the 
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is ‘transformative.’”65  The New Jersey district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of EA; however, the Third Circuit reversed 
and remanded the district court’s decision.66  The Third Circuit held, 
LEXIS 34462 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2008) (where parties settled following discussion of scholarship money 
not being enough to support true value of academic expenses, settlement provided that “plaintiffs will be 
able to make claims for reimbursement of educational expenses up $2,500 a year incurred over the next 
three years. The funds can be used toward a degree or professional certificate at any accredited 
institution.”).  
 59. The list of cases discussed below is merely a snapshot of the various legal arenas in which 
these battles have been fought, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list.  
 60. See Lynne M. J. Boisineau, Intellectual Property Law: The Right of Publicity and the Social 
Media Revolution, GPSOLO (2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2013/may_june/intellectual_property_law_right_publi
city_and_social_media_revolution.html.  
 61. See infra Section IV.a for a discussion of Antitrust Law and its methods for protecting 
property rights. 
 62. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 63. See id. at 145 (“Specifically, Appellant’s claims stemmed from Appellee’s alleged use of his 
likeness and biographical information in its NCAA Football series of videogames.”). 
 64. See id. at 158.  
 65. Id. at 159 (quoting Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 
(Cal. 2001)) (citations omitted).  Electronic Arts bolstered their transformative use defense by further 
suggesting that the video game falls within the freedom of expression, asking the Court to determine 
whether the interest in safeguarding the right of publicity overpowers the interest in safeguarding free 
expression.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 149.  
 66. Hart, 717 F.3d at 170.  
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inter alia, that EA’s videogames “do not sufficiently transform 
Appellant’s identity to escape the right of publicity claim.”67 
On remand, the California district court consolidated Hart (on remand 
and mentioned above) with O’Bannon and Keller and additionally 
granted class certification for NCAA football and NCAA basketball 
players.68  Around the same time, the certified class reached a settlement 
with EA and the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC), but not with the 
NCAA.69  The settlement provided a total of $40 million payable to 
“student athletes whose names, jersey numbers and/or likenesses were 
used in EA video games.”70  In order to accommodate the individual 
athletes’ circumstances, payment depended on “claims asserted by the 
student, the number of appearances, and extent of their appearance” with 
an opportunity to receive up to $1000 per appearance.71  This was a 
major win for the student athletes—perhaps the only win.  The claims 
against the NCAA remain in dispute and are addressed in Part IV with 
the full analysis of O’Bannon.  
B. Collective Bargaining  
In 2013, Kain Colter, a former Northwestern University quarterback, 
organized a movement to unite college athletes.72  Colter hoped to “reset 
the balance of power between players, their universities, and the 
NCAA.”73  Ultimately, this movement resulted in a push to unionize 
Northwestern University football players for collective bargaining 
purposes under the National Labor Relations Act (Act).74 
 67. Id.  However, the Court circled back to the First Amendment discussion by stating that EA’s 
“apparent use of Appellant’s likeness in NCAA Football 2009 is protected by the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 68. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 2049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).  See infra note 100 for class 
certification details. 
 69. Summary Jury Trial Data Collection Form, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig., No. 4:09-cv-01967-CW, 2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 10132 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2013).  
Settlement with the NCAA was impracticable because the antitrust claims had not yet been argued.  
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049.   
 70. In Re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, supra note 69. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Northwestern Football Union Timeline, ESPN (Aug. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/13456482/northwestern-football-union-line.  Colter, his teammates, and players from 
Georgia and Georgia Tech all wore armbands with the hashtag “#APU”, which stands for “All Players 
United.” 
 73. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-
players-cannot-unionize.html?_r=0 (“He argued that with all the time demands on players and the ever-
increasing money flowing through college sports, players deserved a greater say in issues like safety and 
long-term health care.”). 
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Before any bargaining could take place, the NLRB’s Regional 
Director had to determine whether the players were “employees” within 
the meaning of the Act.75  On review, the Regional Director of the 
NLRB found that “players receiving scholarships from [Northwestern 
University] are employees under Section 2(3) of the Act.”76  This 
allowed the players to elect a representative for collective bargaining.77  
Northwestern University requested a review of the Regional Director’s 
decision before the election took place, which the Board approved and 
took under review.78 
In an appeal decision that effectively reversed the Regional Director, 
the Board denied jurisdiction over the issue and dismissed the petition 
filed to elect a representative.79  The Board did not decide whether 
athletes were employees, even though that inquiry was central to the 
Regional Director’s opinion.80  Instead, the Board stated that asserting 
jurisdiction “would not promote stability in labor relations,” which is 
one of the primary purposes of the Act, and therefore denied 
jurisdiction.81 
If a silver lining exists in this decision, it lies in the Board’s snub to 
the employee matter.82  Since the Board avoided discussion of whether 
grant-in-aid scholarship athletes were employees, these athletes still 
enjoy the benefit of the Regional Director’s affirmative decision on the 
matter, and students may use that opinion to bolster future arguments if 
student athletes can prove that the NLRB’s involvement would promote 
labor stability.83  
IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND APPLICATION TO O’BANNON 
After setting the backdrop by introducing the various NCAA and 
student athletes’ suits, it is now appropriate to shift to O’Bannon and 
antitrust law.  In order to understand properly O’Bannon and its effects, 
one must first understand the basics of antitrust law since it is central to 
the dispute.  
 75. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *1 (N.L.R.B. 
Mar. 26, 2014).  The University—effectively the employer—sought review after players were initially 
permitted to seek union representation.  Id. 
 76. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, slip op. at 1.  Ballots were held in secret until 
the decision from the Board was finalized.  Id. at 1 n. 1. 
 79. Id. at 1. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. at 3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Nw. Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, slip op. at 1.  
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A. A Snapshot of Sherman Antitrust Law84 
From early on, the Sherman Antitrust Act85 sought to “protect, not 
destroy, rights of property.”86  Toward that end, in the first section, the 
Sherman Act outlaws “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations.”87  The second section expands 
this restraint to prohibit “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States.”88  
While Sherman seeks to promote competition, enhance trade, and 
protect property rights through its rigid prohibition on monopolies and 
conspiracies, the Supreme Court has recognized that not every restraint 
of trade is necessarily bad for commerce.89  Instead, the Supreme Court 
has developed two approaches to evaluating antitrust inquiries.  Under 
the first approach, “certain kinds of agreements will so often prove so 
harmful to competition and so rarely prove justified that antitrust laws 
do not require proof that agreement of that kind is anticompetitive in 
particular circumstances; agreement of such kind is unlawful, per se.”90  
Under the second approach, courts must approach “those [agreements] 
whose legality may be determined only upon a fact-specific inquiry into 
competitive effects . . . using what has become known as the ‘rule of 
reason.’”91  Under this latter analysis, the true test of legality asks 
whether the restraint imposed is one aimed to regulate and promote 
commerce, or rather one to suppress or destroy competition.92 
 84. Sherman is just one area of antitrust law and was the focus of the athletes’ disputes, 
therefore, it will be the only area discussed in this paper.   
 85. “An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies.”  51 
Cong. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2012)). 
 86. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).  Many other purposes have 
been stated in relation to Sherman; however, property rights are most applicable to those abridged by the 
NCAA (i.e., NILs).  For additional examples, see TV Signal Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. 2d 
1256, 1972 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (15 U.S.C. § 2 “is aimed at acquisition or retention of effective market 
control”) and White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982) 
(“protecting competition . . . is the central purpose of” 15 U.S.C. § 2.). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 89. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (overturning a 
lower court’s decision to wholly enjoin defendants from maintain combination in the contracts for cast-
iron pipes). 
 90. NYNEX Corp. v Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998).  
 91. Timothy K. Armstrong, Dueling Monologues on the Public Domain: What Digital Copyright 
Can Learn from Antitrust, 1 U. CIN. INTELL. PROP. & COMPUTER L.J. 1 (2016), 
http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/1. 
 92. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
 
11
Kitko: The Law May Cave, But Economics Will Not
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
330 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85 
Application of the “rule of reason” in the Ninth Circuit—where the 
parties are litigating O’Bannon—follows a three-step framework 
outlined in Tanaka v. University of Southern California: 
 
[1] The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the 
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a 
relevant market.  [2] If the plaintiff meets this burden, the 
defendant must come forward with evidence of the restraint’s 
procompetitive effects.  [3] The plaintiff must then show that any 
legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less 
restrictive manner.93 
 
The court concluded that O’Bannon’s claim was not egregious enough 
to be analyzed under the per se approach, so the court evaluated the 
claim under the “rule of reason.”94  
B. O’Bannon’s Suit  
In 2009, Ed O’Bannon, a former college basketball player, sued the 
NCAA and the CLC95 when he noticed an avatar of himself on a video 
game at a friend’s house.96  O’Bannon claimed that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules—which prevented compensating athletes for the use of 
their NILs—were an illegal restraint on trade prohibited by Section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.97 
Concurrently, Sam Keller, a former NCAA quarterback, sued the 
NCAA, CLC, and EA Sports.  Keller made the same allegations as 
O’Bannon; however, Keller brought his claims under Indiana’s and 
California’s right of publicity statutes.98  Given the similarity of their 
claims, the court consolidated the cases during the pretrial proceedings 
and also consolidated Hart when it was remanded.99  The court then 
 93. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Court went on to 
explain the meaning of the term “relevant market” “encompasses notions of geography as well as 
product use, quality, and description.  The geographic market extends to the area of effective 
competition . . . where buyers can turn for alternative sources of supply.  The product market includes 
the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of 
demand.”  Id. (quoting Oltz v. St. Peter’s Comty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 94. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 95. The Collegiate Licensing Company is “the entity which licenses the trademarks of the 
NCAA and a number of its member schools for commercial use.”  Id. at 1055. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  
 98. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
 99. Id.  In addition to Keller and O’Bannon, the Third Circuit’s Hart case was consolidated into 
this action against EA and the CLC.  Id. 
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granted class certification to NCAA student athletes in football and 
basketball.100  As a class, the plaintiffs settled their claims with EA and 
the CLC—which the Court approved—and the cases were 
deconsolidated to pursue their separate claims.101  O’Bannon and the 
NCAA went to a bench trial in 2014 to handle the antitrust claims.102 
1. Application of Antitrust Law to O’Bannon’s Case 
The primary components of the suit included proof of relevant 
markets that are affected by the NCAA’s amateurism rules and 
application of the “rule of reason” to the restraints imposed by those 
rules.  The next three sections will discuss the district and circuit court’s 
grounds for deciding both issues.  Although the focus of this article is 
the “rule of reason” analysis, it will first explore the relevant markets in 
order to understand the NCAA’s specific revenue streams from which 
student athletes are excluded. 
a. Relevant Markets 
In order to prove the NCAA’s alleged antitrust violations, O’Bannon 
had to prove an unfair restraint on trade in markets related to him and 
other NCAA athletes.  The district court and circuit court agreed with 
O’Bannon that the NCAA’s rules unfairly restrained trade in both the 
college education market and the group licensing market.103  The court 
admitted that the markets share many of the same participants, but “each 
market ultimately involves a different set of buyers, sellers, and 
products.”104 
The student athletes specifically challenged NCAA rules that 
“prohibit student athletes from receiving any compensation from their 
schools or outside sources for the use of their [NILs] in live game 
telecasts, videogames, game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other 
archival footage.”105  Additionally, NCAA rules prohibit student athletes 
 100. Id. at 1055–56 (The class consisted of “[a]ll current and former student-athletes residing in 
the United States who compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division I (formerly known as 
‘University Division’ before 1973) college or university men’s basketball team or on an NCAA Football 
Bowl Subdivision (formerly known as Division I-A until 2006) men’s football team and whose images, 
likenesses and/or names may be, or have been, included or could have been included (by virtue of their 
appearance in a team roster) in game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by Defendants, their co-
conspirators, or their licensees.”). 
 101. Id. at 1056.  To recall the settlement discussed in the Hart case, see supra Part II and note 70.  
 102. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056. 
 103. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp.3d 955, 965–69 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 104. Id. at 965. 
 105. Id. at 971. 
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from receiving any “financial aid based on athletics ability that exceeds 
the value of a full ‘grant in aid.’”106  This grant-in-aid amount varies 
from school to school and covers the direct expenses associated with 
attending college, but not the ancillary expenses such as money for food 
or entertainment.107  If a student acquires any additional aid, his 
scholarship will be revoked and amateur eligibility forfeited.108  A 
payment from EA would qualify as financial aid that exceeds the value 
of a full grant-in-aid, and student athletes who accepted such payment 
would forfeit their eligibility. 
i. College Education Market 
For the purposes of this discussion, Division I athletics and Division I 
education go hand in hand.  Division I basketball and FBS109 football 
competition are distinct from the other options available to aspiring 
athletes.110  Although the other options do exist, studies have shown that 
“elite football and basketball recruits rarely forego opportunities to play 
FBS football or Division I basketball” in order to play in the alternative 
leagues.111  These divisions attract the most competitive athletes and 
provide “unique bundles of goods and services.”112  In return, the 
athletes provide their services both on the field and off, which include 
indirectly offering the schools the right to use their NILs.113  Because 
there is no viable substitute for these leagues, the market is relevant and 
the restraint imposed by the NCAA is potentially unfair.  In other words, 
there is only one competitive market for these sports.  Similarly, there is 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  “The bylaws define a full grant-in-aid as financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, 
room and board, and required course-related books.  This amount varies from school to school and from 
year to year.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 108. O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 972 (“Any student-athlete who receives financial aid in excess of 
this amount forfeits his athletic eligibility.”).  The court also explained that students are free to earn any 
amount of money through on-campus or off-campus employment, so long as that employment is 
unrelated to their athletic ability.  Id. 
 109. Football Bowl Subdivision; formerly known as Division 1-A, which is the top level of 
competition in college athletics. 
 110. O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 965.  “The only potential substitutes that the NCAA has identified 
are the opportunities offered by schools in other divisions, collegiate athletics associations, or minor and 
foreign professional sports leagues.”  Id. at 966.  
 111. Id. at 967.  
 112. Id. at 965.  “The bundles include scholarships to cover the cost of tuition, fees, room and 
board, books, certain school supplies, tutoring, and academic support services. . . . [T]hey also include 
access to high-quality coaching, medical treatment, state-of-the-art athletic facilities, and opportunities 
to compete at the highest level of college sports, often in front of large crowds and television 
audiences.” 
 113. Id. at 966 (“They also implicitly agree to pay any costs of attending college and participating 
in intercollegiate athletics that are not covered by their scholarships.”). 
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only one competitive market for a Division I education, and if students 
refuse to forego Division I athletics, then they impliedly refuse to forego 
a Division I education, which is arguably more important.  Therefore, 
the courts reviewed the legality under antitrust law because the NCAA 
Division I athletic and academic opportunity is in a market of its own, 
which is restricted by NCAA policies.114 
ii. Group Licensing Market  
The student athletes successfully argued and proved that a market 
exists in which, collectively, they could sell “group licenses for the use 
of their [NILs].”115  This broad group licensing market breaks down into 
three subcategories that the student athletes presented: (1) live game 
telecasts; (2) sports video games; and (3) game rebroadcasts, 
advertisements, and other archival footage.116  According to the courts, 
each subcategory has a proven demand,117 and, “but for the NCAA’s 
compensation rules, college football and basketball athletes would be 
able to sell group licenses for the use of their NILs.”118  As in the 
college education market, this is potentially an unfair restraint on trade 
and is subject to scrutiny under Sherman antitrust law.  
b. Rule of Reason Analysis on Market Restraints 
As previously mentioned, the NCAA’s restraints on the college 
education market and group licensing market were not egregious enough 
to constitute per se violations, so the courts reviewed the claims under 
 114. Id. at 984.  
 115. O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 968 (“Specifically, they contend that members of certain FBS 
football and Division I basketball teams would be able to join together to offer group licenses, which 
they would then be able to sell to their respective schools, third-party licensing companies, or media 
companies seeking to use student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.”). 
 116. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).  “(1) a submarket for group 
licenses to use student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in live football and basketball game 
telecasts; (2) a submarket for group licenses to use student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in 
videogames; and (3) a submarket for group licenses to use student-athletes’ names, images, and 
likenesses in game re-broadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage.”  O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d 
at 968. 
 117. “With respect to live game telecasts, the [district] court noted that the TV networks that 
broadcast live college football and basketball games ‘often seek to acquire the rights to use’ the players’ 
NILs, which the court concluded ‘demonstrate[s] that there is a demand for these rights’ on the 
networks’ part. . . With respect to video games, the court found that the use of NILs increased the 
attractiveness of college sports video games to consumers, creating a demand for players’ NILs . . . . 
And with respect to archival footage, the court noted that the NCAA had licensed footage of student-
athletes—including current athletes—to a third-party licensing company, T3Media, proving that there is 
demand for such footage.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057 (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 968–71). 
 118. Id. (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 968). 
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the “rule of reason.” 
Under the “rule of reason,” plaintiffs carry the initial burden of 
proving anticompetitive effects of the alleged restraint in a relevant 
market.119  If plaintiffs meet that burden, then the burden shifts to the 
defendants to provide procompetitive justifications for such restraint 
(i.e., the restraint still promotes competition rather than inhibit it).120  
Finally, the plaintiffs may rebut the justifications by proving that less 
restrictive alternatives exist to obtain virtually the same effect as the 
restraint otherwise would.121 
At the district court trial, plaintiff’s expert spoke to the restraints that 
these compensation limits impose on student athletes.122  He stated that 
the cap on student compensation through scholarships impeded the 
schools’ ability to compete with one another to compensate students.123  
But for the NCAA’s prohibition on unlimited compensation to athletes, 
member schools could pay students amounts exceeding the direct, 
aforementioned costs and thus acquire the best talent possible.124  The 
court adopted this reasoning and came to a similar conclusion regarding 
the use of students’ NILs.125 
To combat the plaintiffs’ initial burden, the NCAA gave five 
procompetitive justifications for the restraint imposed.126  The NCAA 
needed the court to validate just one procompetitive justification in order 
to continue their practice of prohibiting student compensation.127  The 
district court accepted the first and third justifications while rejecting the 
others.128  The first justification was the NCAA’s need to preserve 
amateurism since it is a driver of consumer demand—though not the 
primary driver of demand.129  The third was the integration of academics 
 119. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 972. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 973 (“The recruit provides his athletic performance and the use of his name, image, and 
likeness.  However, the schools agree to value the latter at zero by agreeing not to compete with each 
other to credit any other value to the recruit in the exchange.  This is an anticompetitive effect.  Thus, 
the Court finds that the NCAA has the power—and exercises that power—to fix prices and restrain 
competition in the college education market that Plaintiffs have identified.”). 
 126. Id. (“The NCAA asserts that the challenged restrictions on student-athlete compensation are 
reasonable because they are necessary to preserve its tradition of amateurism, maintain competitive 
balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams, promote the integration of academics and 
athletics, and increase the total output of its product.”). 
 127. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d 955. 
 128. See id. at 973–81. 
 129. See id. at 973–78.  “The district court was not persuaded that amateurism is 
the primary driver of consumer demand for college sports—but it did find that amateurism serves some 
procompetitive purposes.  The court first concluded that consumers are primarily attracted to college 
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and athletics; however, the court stated that the restraints on 
compensation are not the cause for the benefits derived from this 
integration.130 
The final step of the “rule of reason” analysis requires the court to 
determine if less restrictive alternatives exist to serve the NCAA’s 
procompetitive justifications.131  The district court found two 
substantially less restrictive alternatives that would be virtually as 
effective as the NCAA’s current amateur-status rule.132  The suggested 
alternatives were: (1) allowing NCAA member schools to give student 
athletes grants-in-aid that cover the full cost of attendance; and (2) 
allowing member schools to pay student athletes small amounts of 
deferred cash compensation for use of their NILs.133  The district court 
found that $5,000 was the appropriate figure to allocate to student 
athletes in deferred cash payments held in trust and made available after 
student athletes left school.134  The Court reached this figure through the 
cross-examination of Neal Pilson, a television sports consultant, 
formerly employed by CBS.135  Pilson conceded his uncertainty when 
pressed to provide a fair amount to pay student athletes, but later stated, 
“I tell you that a million dollars would trouble me and $5,000 
wouldn’t.”136 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the first alternative, but 
did find clear error in the second, suggesting that students would use the 
deferred cash payments intended to bridge the gap between expenses 
and scholarship dollars as a means to eventually reap the full benefits of 
their NILs.137  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit struck down the district 
court’s basis for proposing the $5,000 figure.138  The Ninth Circuit said 
Pilson’s lack of concern for a potential payment of $5,000 “is simply not 
enough to support the district court’s far-reaching conclusion that 
sports for reasons unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or affinity for the school 
in their region of the country.”  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059.  
 130. See O’Bannon, 7 F.Supp.3d at 979–81.  “The district court allowed that this was a viable 
procompetitive justification for the NCAA’s regulating the college education market, but it concluded 
that most of the benefits of academic and athletic ‘integration’ are not the result of the NCAA’s rules 
restricting compensation.  Rather, these benefits are achieved by other NCAA rules—such as those 
requiring student-athletes to attend class, prohibiting athletes-only dorms, and forbidding student-
athletes to practice more than a certain number of hours per week.”  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059–60. 
 131. Id. at 1072.   
 132. Id. at 1074. 
 133. Id. at 1076–78.  
 134. Id. 
 135. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076–78. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1078 (“Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism 
and no defined stopping point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary 
limit imposed by the district court until they have captured the full value of their NIL.”). 
 138. Id. 
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paying students $5,000 per year will be as effective in preserving 
amateurism as the NCAA’s current policy.”139 
O’Bannon is the NCAA and student athletes’ most recent and 
relevant legal battle.  Although it seems like a win for the student 
athletes, its holding is far from balancing the scales between the NCAA 
and its athletes.  O’Bannon is peculiar because its claims are based in 
antitrust law.  Under the antitrust “rule of reason” analysis, broad policy 
justifications permit otherwise illegal restraints to remain valid.  In 
O’Bannon, while the court recognized the illegal restraint, the NCAA 
overcame its illegality by using justifications such as preserving 
amateurism and integrating academics and athletics.  While the court 
accepted these justifications to continue permitting the restraints on 
student athletes, there are likely other justifications that student athletes 
will have to overcome in future battles with the NCAA.  
V. CONSIDERATIONS NOT INCLUDED IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS140  
Antitrust law provides a unique safety net for parties caught in its 
web.  While the law prohibits certain trade restraints on a per se basis, 
other restraints are deemed legal so long as adequate justification exists 
and the restraint is sufficiently narrow.  The “rule of reason” analysis 
allows parties to argue the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of 
the challenged restraint.  The plaintiff can invalidate an agreement that 
imposes a restraint if he can prove that the restraint carries heavier 
anticompetitive effects than it does procompetitive effects, or that the 
restraint is overly restrictive.  In contrast, the defendant can maintain his 
agreement if he can prove that the restraint furthers legitimate, 
procompetitive goals.141  This three-part inquiry misses a consideration 
that may have a more stifling effect than anti-competitiveness: 
impracticability.  The next section of this article focuses on various 
considerations that an antitrust analysis overlooks.  Prior to that 
discussion, this section outlines some of the changes the NCAA has 
already made to accommodate the challenges that athletes have brought 
in their various complaints.  The next sections discuss the economic and 
structural impracticalities of a pay-to-play scheme in the NCAA. 
 139. Id. 
 140. There are many more considerations not considered in this analysis.  Some of those 
considerations that should be brought to light are: fair compensation for past players who created 
demand for universities and conferences, the revolving door of NCAA athletics non-contract based 
performance, additional areas of compensation that athletes do not realize, and more.  
 141. Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need for 
Analytics in Applying the Sherman to Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 
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A. NCAA Changes in the Wake of Student Athlete Challenges 
In 2014, the NCAA Division I Board of Directors “restructured how 
schools and conferences will govern themselves” by allowing more 
student-athlete input in key issues at all levels.142  After all, who would 
know what student athletes need better than a student athlete? 
Under this new model, the Division I Board of Directors includes 
student athletes, faculty representatives, athletics directors, and a female 
administrator.143  Additionally, the top five conferences streamlined the 
legislative process to put issues immediately before the Board and now 
have three student-athlete representatives from each conference to vote 
on conference rule changes.144  Another benefit that student athletes will 
indirectly receive from these changes comes from the autonomy granted 
to the five major conferences (SEC, ACC, Big 10, Big 12, and Pac 12).  
Now, these conferences will be able to govern areas related to student-
athlete wellbeing such as: (1) health and wellness; (2) meals and 
nutrition; (3) financial aid; (4) expenses and benefits in student-athlete 
support and pre-enrollment support; (5) insurance and career translation; 
(6) career pursuits; (7) time demands; (8) transfer eligibility; (9) 
academic support; (10) recruiting; and (11) personnel.145  The NCAA 
selected these conferences based on their commitment to student-athlete 
wellbeing and their preparedness to face “public comment and criticism 
. . . from advocates for pay-for-play or a professional athletics system 
for colleges and universities.”146  These pressures will, perhaps, help 
student athletes in their quest for compensation. 
While these changes will not necessarily earn players the paychecks 
they were hoping for, they seem markedly appropriate given the 
comments of the NLRB in the Northwestern decision.  There, the Board 
denied jurisdiction because collective bargaining through unionization 
would not promote labor stability.147  The effective result of both the 
NCAA’s changes and the NLRB’s decision is to put the NCAA and its 
athletes on the same side of the table, tackling issues together. 
 142. Hosick, supra note 55.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Division I Steering Committee on Governance: Recommended Governance Model 29-30, 
NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Steering%20Commitee%20on%20Gov%20Proposed%20
Model%2007%2018%2014%204.pdf.  The financial aid permissions will include, but not be limited to, 
autonomy in eligibility, period of award, reduction or cancellation and renewals or non-renewals. Id. 
 146. Id. at 28. 
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B. Economic Barriers 
The extralegal challenges in compensating student athletes are 
overwhelming and impracticable.  For starters, the district court’s 
decision in O’Bannon contained a void that went overlooked by the 
Ninth Circuit.  In order to make an antitrust claim, the challenging party 
must prove that an unfair restraint is imposed on a legally-recognized 
right of theirs.  In the past, student athletes had never held a property 
right in their NILs because the NCAA has traditionally valued each NIL 
at zero.  Now, however, the NCAA suggests that a student athlete’s 
value is equal to $5,000.  Yet the footing for that conclusion is unstable, 
as the district court rested on an expert’s loosely stated range stretching 
from $5,000 to $1,000,000—a range that the Ninth Circuit later 
invalidated.  Therefore, the student athletes’ argument is premised on a 
property right that has never been legally recognized, while this 
newfound property right is grounded on shaky footing.  Perhaps the 
reason for both the district court and Ninth Circuit decisions is that the 
NCAA and the courts have simultaneously realized student athletes’ 
NILs have value, but assigning a monetary value is nearly impossible. 
Recall that antitrust law seeks to protect property rights by granting 
the owners of those rights the freedom to dispose of them at their own 
behest.  But, a property right must first exist in order for it to be 
protected.  In order for the right to exist and be recognized, certain 
economic conditions must be met; otherwise, the right does not exist, 
will not be recognized, and cannot be protected by antitrust law. 
Consider the following conditions in terms of student athletes.  First, 
the financial incentive must encourage the athletes to compete.148  
Second, the student athletes’ economic value must be capable of being 
misappropriated.149  Third, but for being paid, athletes would not 
play.150  Fourth, granting student athletes a property right and 
compensating them is the best way to advance the public interest.151  
Combining the first and third principles of this inquiry with the district 
court’s “valuation” in O’Bannon illustrates the conundrum of assigning 
student athletes value. 
Under the first and third principles, the student athletes must show 
that more athletes would compete if the NCAA paid its student athletes.  
However, an article released in 2014 suggests that the NCAA’s 
 148. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22 (2003).  
 149. Id. at 23. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellant at 9, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos.14-16601, 14-17068) (citing 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977)). 
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participation levels continue to climb, even though athletes are not paid.  
The NCAA reported that the 2013–2014 season reached all-time highs 
with 472,625 players on 19,086 teams across twenty-three different 
sports.152 
Now consider the potential challenges to assigning a fair value to 
each of the 472,625 student athletes.  While the district court deemed 
$5,000 fair, one would be hard-pressed to think each of those 472,625 
players represent the same value.  Perhaps the NCAA already 
demonstrated that by drawing the immediate distinction between 
Division I athletics and the other divisions.  Would that same distinction 
not exist in the smaller sampling of student athletes that comprise 
Division I? 
Consider the conjoint analysis153 discussed in A Rapid Reaction to 
O’Bannon: The Need for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to 
Overly Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes.154  In this analysis, the author 
considered the limits to student-athlete compensation in order to 
maintain consumer demand for college football and basketball.155  The 
results indicated that not paying athletes created the most positive effect 
on consumer demand, while paying the athlete between $5,000 and 
$50,000 showed incrementally worse effects.156  Therefore, if student 
athletes are paid based on their value and their value is based on their 
demand, but consumer demand is inversely related to compensation, 
then paying athletes will decrease their value.  More stifling than this is 
the fact that the analysis began with assigning three different ticket 
values to three different games, where the price of the ticket also 
inversely affected demand.  Therefore, a vicious cycle begins: when 
student athletes are compensated, ticket prices increase to offset costs, 
which in turn also decreases consumer demand, subsequently decreasing 
the value of the student athlete, and so on. 
These two analyses represent basic economics principles that cannot 
be avoided with the compensation of student athletes. 
C. Practicability  
While the economic barriers previously discussed heighten the 
 152. Greg Johnson, Athletics Participation Rates Continue to Rise: More Than 19,000 Teams 
Competed in NCAA Sports in 2013–2014, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/athletics-participation-rates-continue-rise.   
 153. “Conjoint analysis is a set of market research techniques that measures the value or utility a 
specific market places on each feature or attribute of a designated brand of product/service and predicts 
the value of any combination of features.”  Ross & DeSarbo, supra note 141, at 53. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Id. at 53. 
 156. Id. 
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hurdles for student-athlete compensation, another major hurdle still 
exists: practicability.157  The conjoint analysis depicted the circular 
effect compensation would have on demand and value of student 
athletes from a broad perspective.  Yet, what the analysis did not 
consider was varying demands across different conferences, teams, and 
players.158  Since demand varies at all three levels and the cause for the 
demand is indeterminate, there is no fair solution to student-athlete 
compensation. 
1. Conference Level 
Starting at the conference level, analytics show that consumer 
demand varies from one conference to the next, even including within 
the top five conferences discussed in the NCAA’s recent policy 
changes.159  Each season, Sports Media Watch compiles data on 
television ratings for Division I football games.  This data is then broken 
down to show the various ratings by conference and team.160  Based on 
the 2013 study, the SEC had the most viewers and the highest television 
ratings, followed by the Big Ten, ACC, Pac 12, Big 12, MWC, AAC, 
MAC, C-USA, and Sun Belt, respectively.161  In 2013, the SEC had an 
average of 3.8 million viewers per week, while the Big 10 had an 
average of 2.92 million, indicating a stark difference in consumer 
demand.162  Then, in 2014, the SEC remained atop the list averaging 
4.52 million viewers per week, while the Big 10 averaged 2.69 
million.163  Certainly, players graduated and left the various teams in the 
conferences and demand changed, but viewership did not dissipate.  
This indicates that the conference—and not solely the players—drives at 
least some demand.  Student athletes’ NIL value at a conference level is 
therefore undefined because, outside of individual consumer surveys, it 
is impossible to determine which viewers are watching because of the 
 157. This is just the tip of the iceberg for the practicability discussion.  Other considerations that 
should be brought to light are: student-athlete tenure and its varying effect on team demand; 
compensation already offered to students through intangibles, scholarships, and grants; NFL and NBA 
preparation and readiness not offered through other channels; and fame and reputability for future 
compensation.  
 158. See College Football TV Ratings for Teams and Conferences: 2013 Regular Season, SB 
NATION (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.goodbullhunting.com/2013/12/17/5216550/college-football-tv-
ratings-2013-regular-season-final-sec.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.; Phil Miller, Analyzing 2014 College Football Television Ratings, SPORTS ECONOMIST 
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://thesportseconomist.com/2015/02/09/analyzing-2014-college-football-television-
ratings/.  
 163. Analyzing 2014 College Football Television Rankings, supra note 162. 
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players and which are watching because of the conference. 
2. Team Level 
The data from the next level, team demand, indicates that the 
University of Alabama—the top rated member of the SEC in 2013—had 
an average of 6.47 million viewers per week, while the Ohio State 
University—the second rated member of the Big Ten in 2014—had 5.24 
million.164  Then in 2014, Alabama had 6.02 million viewers per week, 
while Ohio State had 3.81 million.165  Although demand for the Big 10 
conference remained high, demand for the individual school, Ohio State, 
dropped.  Interestingly, Ohio State won the National Championship in 
2014, suggesting the program had the best players in the NCAA and 
therefore should have more viewers.  This again indicates that the 
demand for the student athlete is indeterminate, and calculating fair 
compensation for that student athlete is nearly impossible if the 
conference, as well as the team, drive demand. 
3. Player Level 
Now consider demand at the level of the individual student athletes.  
Consumer demand in relation to individual student athletes varies just 
like team and conference demand.  Recall that value is based on 
consumer demand; a student athlete’s valuation, which would likely 
correspond to his payment, must therefore include demand that he drives 
individually.  This level of demand is likely the student athletes’ most 
practical argument for compensation. 
In O’Bannon, the plaintiffs presented evidence at trial regarding a 
market for jersey sales that creates additional value for the student 
athletes’ NILs.166  As the district court properly noted, the plaintiffs 
abandoned this argument because it would not have bolstered the 
argument for group licenses; rather, it would have suggested proof of a 
market for individual licenses.167  The NCAA could easily recognize 
which individual player is responsible for driving the demand for a 
particular jersey because the player’s name is stitched on the back.  
Identifying the individual player responsible for driving demand based 
on the name on the jersey suggests that individual licenses should be 
granted to those players, but does not support a claim that a group 
license is necessary.  However, the NCAA rules prohibit colleges from 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp. 3d 955, 968 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. 2014).   
 167. Id. 
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selling jerseys depicting players’ names, yet do not prohibit them from 
selling jerseys with the most popular players’ numbers.168   
Even though the plaintiffs abandoned the argument, they failed to 
address how NCAA rules would additionally prohibit the schools from 
identifying individuals through jersey sales.  Perhaps it was just a 
coincidence that a consumer could easily purchase a #8 jersey from 
Oregon and a #5 jersey from Florida State, representing Marcus Mariota 
and Jameis Winston—two 2014 Heisman Trophy finalists.169  The 
NCAA eventually recognized the potential legal threat of appropriation 
by simply selling jerseys with the numbers of the most popular players.  
In response, some member schools ceased selling jerseys with popular 
players’ numbers on them in order to avoid a battle similar to the one 
faced when student athletes’ names were stitched on the back.170  
Currently, these schools are selling jerseys with generic numbers on 
them, consistent from year to year, and unassociated with a particular 
player. 
 Practical challenges come into play when the NCAA changes its 
bylaws to allow schools to pay athletes for demand driven by and 
attributable to each student athlete.  Additionally, suppose the NCAA 
allowed schools to print names on the back of their jerseys, thus 
allowing consumers to communicate their support of a certain player.  
Because the NCAA must give a portion of those revenues to the player, 
the school, the distributor, and the manufacturer, and because all of 
these portions add up to an increased cost to the consumer, the vicious 
demand cycle is again initiated.171 
Adding to this dilemma, let us again suppose the NCAA will allow 
schools to compensate student athletes for demand driven and 
attributable to each student athlete.  However, suppose also that the 
NCAA has maintained its current policy of prohibiting jerseys from 
displaying players’ names.  Under this scenario, a consumer can 
purchase a jersey displaying the numbers of the most popular players on 
the field.  Therefore, with respect to Ohio State, a person can purchase a 
 168. NCAA Academic and Membership Affairs Staff, 2009–10 NCAA Division I Manual, NCAA 
(Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D110.pdf.   
 169. Jason Kirk, NCAA President Faces Fact That Colleges Sell Jerseys with Real Player 
Numbers, SB NATION (June 20, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2014/6/20/5827802/ncaa-player-jerseys-numbers-mark-emmert-obannon; Michael Casagrande, 
Heisman Trophy 2014: Final Voting Results and Ballot Totals, AL.COM (Dec. 13 2014), 
http://www.al.com/alabamafootball/index.ssf/2014/12/heisman_trophy_2014_final_voti.html.  
 170. Marc Tracy, Days of Selling Popular College Players’ Jerseys Seem Numbered, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/sports/ncaafootball/days-of-selling-popular-
college-players-jerseys-seem-numbered.html?_r=0.  
 171. With that said, the NFL sells individual player’s jerseys and their system seems to be 
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#7 jersey with a degree of confidence that the public will recognize his 
or her support for wide receiver Jalin Marshall.  However, that is not 
necessarily true, because the #7 jersey has been associated with a 
handful of marquee Ohio State players in the past.172  Yet, based on the 
NCAA restrictions and profit-sharing plan, Jalin Marshall will never see 
the revenues generated from that jersey sale.  Instead, those profits go 
into the NCAA revenues that are distributed to its member schools 
based on a schedule. 
The counter to this argument could be to compensate the player who 
wears the jersey at the time of the purchase.  Perhaps the consumer 
purchased the #7 jersey to communicate her love for NFL standout Joey 
Galloway, who played for Ohio State in the ’90s; or, perhaps she bought 
the jersey to show her support for Chris Gamble, who was a member of 
the 2002 Ohio State National Championship team.173  After all, 
consumers purchase historical NFL jerseys all the time, and one may 
safely assume the same for NCAA football jerseys as well.  For 
example, a consumer may purchase a Bernie Kosar jersey—#19, and a 
former quarterback for the Cleveland Browns—because she still 
supports the team now even though Kosar is no longer a part of it.  Yet 
suppose Kosar’s name was not on the back of the jersey.  In that case, 
should the player bearing #19 now get the profits from the jersey? 
There are practical challenges associated with the system towards 
which the NCAA is trending.  The member schools have begun selling 
generic jerseys with the same numbers on them from year to year.  To 
be fair, this trend began after the O’Bannon decision as schools realized 
the potential threat of the student athletes’ NIL appropriation, so there is 
a slight circular-reference problem with this hypothetical.174  
Nevertheless, suppose that student athletes were compensated for 
individual demand.  The sale of each student athlete’s jersey is the 
easiest measure of demand at the individual level.  Teams only sell 
generic jerseys and not any name- or number-specific options.  The 
dilemma that exists from trying to determine what drove the demand for 
the jersey sale has two potential solutions, each of which is improbable.  
First, the NCAA amends the bylaws to require schools to sell jerseys 
 172. All Players Who Wore Jersey Number 7, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH: BUCKEYEXTRA, 
http://buckeyextra.dispatch.com/content/pages/player-jersey-database-results.html?jersey=7 (last visited 
Feb 24, 2016). 
 173. Id. 
 174. The circular-reference problem goes as such: NCAA schools would not stop selling 
specifically numbered jerseys if the student athletes’ NIL rights had not been recognized in O’Bannon.  
Since they were recognized, student athletes could likely enjoin the schools from selling such jerseys, or 
make another case to cause compensation for the sale.  Likewise, since they had been recognized, the 
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with student athletes’ names on them.  Second, schools compensate 
student athletes at a rate corresponding to the proceeds from the generic 
jersey sales, which again introduces the O’Bannon challenge of an 
indeterminate driver of demand.  We know there is a demand for the 
team itself, and we know there is a higher demand for some players’ 
jerseys compared to others.  This would start the same argument all over 
again when the marquee players realize they are receiving the same 
stipend as the others.  Perhaps the same argument would surface if SEC 
players were paid the same as the Big Ten athletes even though the SEC 
is more competitive in revenue and viewership. 
Even if the student athletes overcome the Sherman Antitrust Law, the 
bigger barrier of practicability still exists.  Additionally, there are 
several other considerations this article does not highlight that may still 
affect the practicability of student-athlete compensation.175  These 
considerations are just the tip of the iceberg. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of one’s personal stance on student-athlete compensation, 
challenges clearly exist when modeling an ideal compensation model.  
Any model would require a complete overhaul of the NCAA structure 
and its bylaws, essentially creating a league directly comparable to the 
NFL or NBA.  As consumers, the public should be hesitant to adopt that 
system given the youth involved and the risks to which they would be 
exposed.  It is important to remember that in a system where the student 
athletes are fighting to get the most they can for their perceived value, 
the NCAA will seek to squeeze that value—ultimately hurting both 
parties.  The NCAA and the student athletes will be fighting a proxy 
battle through their agents, each trying to achieve the best terms for their 
side.  This battle will unfold in place of putting the best product on the 
field, thereby decreasing consumer demand and hurting third-party fans.  
Part I of this article introduced the idea of the NCAA and the revenue 
gap between it and its student athletes.  Part I further provided a 
guideline of the article’s process for reaching the antitrust claims and 
practicability challenges regarding student-athlete compensation.  Part II 
discussed the NCAA’s history, the role amateurism plays in the NCAA, 
and the gap in revenue mentioned above.  Part III discussed a brief 
history of the cases the NCAA and its athletes have battled, ultimately 
leading to O’Bannon.  Part IV continued with O’Bannon by introducing 
antitrust law—the basis for O’Bannon’s suit—and how it affected the 
outcome of the case.  Following this was an analysis of the 
 175. See supra note 157. 
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considerations that antitrust, the courts, and student athletes have yet to 
evaluate in order to earn fair compensation.  This section highlighted 
various challenges related to NCAA governance, basic economics, and 
practicability.  The final verdict is this: while paying student athletes 
may eventually be legal in the future, it is not presently feasible, given 




Kitko: The Law May Cave, But Economics Will Not
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
